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Studies of blockchain governance can be divided into analyses of the governance of
blockchains (such as rules and power dynamics within a given network) and
governance by blockchains (such as how blockchains can be implemented to
improve self-governance of community-based peer production networks). Less
emphasis has been placed on applications of distributed ledgers to public sector
governance. Our review clariﬁes that the decentralization and distributive features that
enable blockchains to link up loosely connected private organizations and public
agencies to improve efﬁciency and transparency of government transactions.
However, most blockchain applications lack clear advantages over the
conventional digital recording of information. In addition, our review highlights that
blockchain applications in public sector governance are potentially vast, though in
most instances, the existing applications have not extended much beyond limitedscale pilots. We conclude with a call for the construction of indexes of public sector
implementations of blockchains, as none yet exist, as well as for additional research to
understand why governments have not deployed blockchains more widely.
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INTRODUCTION
Blockchains have been hailed as a building block for a new economy (Davidson et al., 2018). But does
distributed ledger technology harken a revolution in public sector governance? The ﬁrst generation
of scholarship on blockchain governance debated to what extent blockchains replace governments.
Crypto-anarchists, or techno-determinists, see distributed ledgers as unseating government (Atzori,
2015). However, others see a signiﬁcant role for government alongside distributed ledgers in creating
and preserving trustworthy records on evidence of rights, entitlements, and actions as distributed
ledgers provide new ways to record information (Lemieux, 2019). Legal scholars have pointed out
how law and legal infrastructure is useful for blockchain networks (Werbach, 2018), including for
smart contracts (Cohney et al., 2019).

Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org

1

June 2022 | Volume 5 | Article 869665

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4156869

Bustamante et al.

Government by Code

A second generation of blockchain governance research
considers governance of blockchains and governance by
blockchains (Rozas et al., 2021a). Studies of governance of
blockchains recognize that the performance of any given
blockchain network depends on rules internal and external to
the network. The increase in conﬁdence in operations of
computational systems with blockchains depends on proper
operation of the governance of the blockchain network, which
requires trust in individuals with inﬂuence and authority within
those networks (De Filippi et al., 2020). Beyond considerations of
governance internal to and external to blockchains, research on
governance of blockchains embraces that there are thousands of
ways that these networks are organized that offer opportunities
for comparative institutional analysis (Allen et al., 2021a) as well
as how on-chain crises lead to changes in rules governing
blockchains, such as changes resulting from The DAO crisis
(Reijers et al., 2018). These studies infuse consideration of
“invisible politics” of blockchains that occur within networks
and which ultimately contribute to their performance (De Filippi
and Loveluck, 2016).
Blockchains can also be used by organizations as part of their
governance, which is the subject of current studies of governance
by blockchains. Studies of governance by blockchains consider how
self-governing communities, including peer-to-peer communities
and self-governing communities seeking to manage commons on a
global scale, use blockchains to improve their ability to selforganize and self-manage (Rozas et al., 2021b).
Our paper extends research on governance by blockchains by
providing a stock-taking of the applications of blockchain to
public sector governance. To date, surveys of blockchains for
public sector governance have focused on single areas of
implementation, without considering the broad applications of
blockchains for public sector governance. Such domain-speciﬁc
studies and reviews tend to understate the broad range of
possibilities for blockchain use by the public sector. Thus, our
review seeks to catalogue the possibilities for blockchains, as well
as to consider systematically whether blockchains are living up to
their promise.
Our stock-taking ﬁnds that blockchain can improve the public
sector governance on several margins. Many of these applications are
simply government implementing a superior database as far as
security is concerned. For some types of public (permissionless)
cryptocurrencies, blockchains offer an alternative to governmentbacked currencies, though for stablecoins, cryptocurrencies combine
features of governments and new technologies. Thus, while
blockchains create new opportunities for experimentation with
democracy outside the normal challenges of government,
cryptocurrencies reduce reliance on central banks, and smart
contracts facilitate business relations through their links with
Industrial Internet of Things applications (Berg, Davidson, and
Potts 2019), our review suggests that blockchain networks often
work synergistically with traditional governance, and we explore
those synergies here.
Our review also ﬁnds that the deployment of blockchain
technologies depends in part on the government’s
administrative capacity and capability to implement the
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technology. While blockchains are most useful when trust in
government is low (as ledgers provide for greater accountability),
the ability to implement blockchain solutions depends on a
certain degree of administrative and technological capacity.
The ﬁnding that Information and Communication
Technologies and e-government applications confront barriers
to scaling up in the Global South extends to blockchains
(Zambrano, 2020). The digital divide between blockchain
smart government “haves” and “have-nots” is an issue in the
Global North (such as among local jurisdictions within wealthy
countries) as well as within the Global South. For example, the
United States is a technology leader, though blockchains have
barely scratched the surfaces on American Indian reservations
despite the low trust that reservations have in the federal
government. The broadband divide (including “last mile”
problems) and lack of government capacity to digitalize
records thus serves as a constraint on the implementation of
blockchain solutions by governments to improve public sector
governance.
Signiﬁcantly, our review concludes by noting that there is
currently no widely available index of deployments of
blockchains by governments and national and subnational
levels. Thus, our review serves as a call for the development of
such an index. To date, reviews have focused on technical aspects
of implementations to a single realm (such as voting). Since the
applications of blockchains are vast, an index that captures the
diversity of applications is critical to understanding progress in
implementation of blockchains for public sector governance. In
addition, since many blockchain applications have not advanced
far beyond proof of concept or limited-scale pilot
implementations, further research is needed on the barriers to
adoption of blockchains by public sector governments, including
the aforementioned issues with the digital divide. Such research
should consider “ordinary” political barriers to change in
administrative structures, including hesitancy of public ofﬁcials
to adopt novel technologies.
Our review proceeds as follows. We begin this review by
setting forth three broad perspectives on blockchains: as an
alternative to predatory governments and corporations, as a
polycentric enterprise, and as an improved database. Our
review suggests that all three perspectives hold some
explanatory power in considering blockchains and that the
view that blockchains compete with the government tends to
ignore that blockchains are in fact a better database that is, in
most instances, a nested enterprise where the success depends on
a favorable and effective regulatory and legal environment. We
then consider two realms where blockchain can and already is
improving public sector governance: the provision of public
goods and the facilitation of economic exchange. We compare
various government implementations globally. In the conclusion,
we consider some of the ongoing challenges with adopting
blockchain more broadly, including inequities in smart
government using blockchains. Thus, while research is
underway to understand how blockchains are governed that
embraces the diversity of the hundreds, if not thousands, of
ways these networks are organized (Allen et al., 2021a), this
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Blockchain as a Polycentric Enterprise

paper speaks to some of the emergent applications in the public
sector.

A second view of blockchain sees it as a polycentric enterprise (De
Filippi et al., 2020). One of the novel features of blockchains is to
use smart contracts to eliminate ex-post manipulation of the
terms of contracts. This is because all provisions are coded into
the contract, with execution triggered by real-world data that
cannot be manipulated by the contracting parties (De Filippi
et al., 2021). In this regard, blockchains promise complete
contracting, especially with reference to permissioned (or
private) blockchains (Alston et al., 2021). Distributed
autonomous organizations (DAOs) further reduce reliance on
traditional corporate governance or trusted third parties, as
transactions recorded in the blockchain are typically
immutable (Werbach and Cornell, 2017).
Despite these novel aspects, blockchains depend on external
rules. Polycentric governance institutions are nested in higher
levels of governance. Though early internet and
telecommunications industries were often self-governing, law
remained signiﬁcant in the early days of the Internet (Benkler,
2004) and telecommunications (Werbach, 2004), with debates
centered on what the law governing innovative technologies
ought to look like. Smart contracts also frequently rely on
third-party data processors such as oracles in order to
adjudicate contract completion. In the peer-to-peer production
and telecommunications realms, self-governance is signiﬁcant,
though the ongoing role of law and regulation makes the
enterprise polycentric.
In addition to blockchain nesting within established or statesponsored governance, blockchains involve governance
dilemmas similar to any large organization, including those
arising from uncertainty in contractual relations (Howell and
Potgieter, 2021) and the necessity of rules to deal with the
concentration of power (Alston, 2020), as well as blockchainspeciﬁc governance dilemmas, including the need to choose
protocols (Cowen, 2019) and competitive dynamics among
blockchains (Alston, 2021). There are also governance
challenges that arise from reliance on oracles to bring data
from the real world into the digital world (Poblet et al., 2020).
Oracles are software interfaces trusted by contracting parties to
translate real-world data into a form that can be used to
determine whether blockchain’s conditions are satisﬁed and
are often needed to translate those events into the blockchain
(Poblet et al., 2020). In addition, while smart contracts are selfexecuting, disputes over smart contracts still are resolved by ﬂeshand-blood lawyers in the context of traditional courts of law (De
Filippi et al., 2021). Further evidence of blockchain’s polycentric
features is found by examining the evolution of law with these
new kinds of ledgers. The shortcomings of oracles, for instance,
have resulted in an evolving area of negotiation law (Allen et al.,
2019b). Lawyers are useful, and perhaps necessary, to write
contingencies into code.
Polycentricity is thus a general feature of blockchains (Alston
et al., 2021). Any given blockchain network tends to be nested
in higher levels of rules and regulations (Frolov, 2021). Evidence
of the ways that blockchains can beneﬁt from the law is informed
by research on ways cryptocurrency regulations improve
opportunities for users (Whitford and Anderson, 2021) and

BLOCKCHAIN AS A TECHNOLOGY OF
FREEDOM, POLYCENTRIC ENTERPRISE,
AND NEW DATABASE
Considerations of blockchains for governance can be categorized
as taking one or more of the following perspectives: blockchain as
a technology of freedom; as a polycentric enterprise; or as a new
form of database. Blockchains can potentially be all three,
depending on the political, economic, social, and technological
context, and so each perspective sheds some light on their
potential for public sector governance. This section provides a
brief overview of these three perspectives.

Blockchain as a Technology of Freedom
The perspective on blockchain that sees distributed ledger
technology as a new technology of freedom implies a
fundamental distrust in existing governance structures or a
need to escape them. The transparency and immutability of
blockchain make it especially useful in such contexts of
distrust of government (De Filippi and Wright, 2018).
Blockchains, from this perspective, offer some freedom from
an untrusted government by enabling an alternative conﬁrmation
of information. To governments that have already digitalized
government services and enjoy high levels of legitimacy and a
reputation for reliability and transparency, adopting blockchain
may gain little due to the comparatively higher costs of
maintaining blockchains. In the context of unreliable
government, blockchains could be a new architecture of trust.
Certain aspects of the crypto-democracy literature see blockchain
in this way as an alternative means to establish new governments
on a blockchain (Allen et al., 2018). Blockchains allow people to
establish their own governance institutions, as well as
offer—through forking—opportunities to create any given
blockchain (Berg and Berg, 2020). In the currency realm, since
central banks may collude or fail to establish effective monetary
policies (Boettke et al., 2021), cryptocurrencies offer countries an
opportunity for innovation.1
Blockchains can also reduce reliance or dependence on
corporations. Large and powerful modern corporations and
economic entities introduce systematic risks. Blockchain
provides people with an alternative channel to self-organize
besides governments and corporations to improve their
welfare. In the currency realm, since central banks’
monetary policies may not be transparent to the public
(Boettke et al., 2021), cryptocurrencies offer countries an
opportunity for innovation.2

1
For example, in June
Salvador announced it
2
For example, in June
Salvador announced it

2021, in response to proposed G7 currency policies, El
was going to rely more heavily on cryptocurrencies.
2021, in response to proposed G7 currency policies, El
was going to rely more heavily on cryptocurrencies.

Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org

3

June 2022 | Volume 5 | Article 869665

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4156869

Bustamante et al.

Government by Code

analysis of the evolving body of negotiation and enforcement law
for blockchains that parallels conventional negotiation law (Allen
et al., 2019b). This polycentric view thus sees the performance of
any given blockchain as depending on rules internal to a network,
those external to it, and competitive pressures and exit options
that arise from the overall environment within which blockchains
are operating (Alston et al., 2022).
Not all agree with this synergistic view of blockchain, law, and
regulation. Schuster (2020) argues that the law will not and has
not embraced cryptocurrencies. However, state governments in
the United States appear to be competing to provide a friendly
environment for blockchain. Wyoming, for example, passed over
a dozen laws from 2018 to 2020 to establish a framework for the
law to embrace blockchain. Though Wyoming has been called a
blockchain Wild West, these laws show that the government is
regulating blockchain.3 In addition, while it is true that
blockchain has not lived up to its potential, including in areas
such as real estate transactions (Arruñada, 2018), blockchains are
being implemented for the registration of real property. Thus, it
appears there is a demand for blockchain law and governments
are supplying it.

arguments that blockchain is a new institutional technology, it
can also be thought of as a database that is, in some situations, a
superior alternative to digitalization as a better record-keeping
system, but one that is far from perfect. The latter
view—blockchain as a better database—is especially signiﬁcant
in understanding the promise and challenges of blockchain for
public sector governance, as well as one that invites consideration
of digital divides in government capacity to implement new
governance technologies.

BLOCKCHAINS FOR PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
Personal Data
Governments record vast amounts of personal information.
Through fraud or compromised access keys, hackers often
target personal information to access the beneﬁts associated
with it. In situations where security is an issue or where
governments cannot be trusted with the aforementioned
information, blockchains promise opportunities for selfsovereign identity. This process of storing personal
information promises more individual autonomy over personal
data. Our review clariﬁes that in most instances, the role of
government or a trusted party is necessary to authenticate the
personal information stored in decentralized services. Such
applications remain largely conceptual at this point.
One way that governments can use blockchain is to place
personal information on a blockchain, including social security
numbers and printed birth certiﬁcates. One security challenge
with social security numbers is that they are used for minor
identiﬁcation checks and other purposes beyond direct
government identiﬁcation. It creates vulnerabilities for security,
as well as mistakes in record-keeping (as humans remain a weak
link). Though no encryption is certain, blockchain can provide
greater security in these decentralized applications (e.g., opening
bank accounts, verifying credit ratings, etc.) because the records
can be veriﬁed by a distributed rather than centralized process.
Once governments digitalize personal information, that
information can be used for any activity in the government’s
purview, including voting, opening a bank account, and receiving
government services. Such systems could be a mirrored
blockchain, which is one of several types of recording systems
using a blockchain. In a mirrored recording system, records are
placed on a blockchain, and the records on the blockchain can be
compared to the original (digitized) records (Lemieux, 2017). The
advantage here over “normal” digital identiﬁcation is the
combination of transparency and immutability, including
superior ability to determine fraud, as well as redundancy.
Veriﬁcation also becomes much less costly, as the blockchain
record can quickly and easily be compared to the original records.
Consequently, governments may be able to offer greater security
and portability than with conventional government-issued digital
identiﬁcation and storage of personal information. Such systems
would be permissioned as well, or hybrid public-permissioned
blockchains, to address privacy concerns on the blockchain, as
restrictions on who has access to information are necessary. It

Blockchain as a New Database
A third view is that blockchain is a new type of database. While it
is clear that blockchain has a novel combination of affordances
(openness, transparency, and immutability) compared to
previous ledgers, it remains a database. Governments could
also adopt blockchain to mirror their records, adding
robustness to their system of managing information.
An important question in considering the database view in the
context of public sector governance is what it means compared to
previous databases. Public governance functions are distributed
already, at least to some extent. Digitalization is also present and
offers some advantages, without blockchain, compared to other
recording systems. In information and record-keeping contexts,
efﬁciency refers to security and, if desired, transparency and
immutability. This combination of features provides
constraints on certain types of costly behavior. From an
economic perspective, efﬁciency considers the balance of these
beneﬁts against the costs in terms of running blockchain
networks compared to more centralized arrangements.
Blockchain networks are more effective at managing
information in a distributive fashion but at a higher cost than
centralized architectures. Thus, blockchains may be less efﬁcient
from an economic function even if those functions outlined
above—security,
transparency,
and
immutability—are
considered desirable.
Our stock-taking illustrates that all three views hold some
explanatory power. In some applications, blockchain can lead to
contracting outside of government authority. Still, governments
remain able to inﬂuence blockchain, and can in principle, ban
these activities. Moreover, blockchain applications such as smart
contracts often rely on government or third-party authorities to
be successfully implemented and enforced. In addition, despite
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may be costly to implement, and registration through a
blockchain is not essential (as governments routinely do it),
though for citizens concerned about privacy and fraud,
blockchains have advantages over traditional digital recording
of personal information, including identities.
Governments can also support people who use blockchainbased systems to store their personal information. In such
instances, the service of placing information on a blockchain is
provided privately, with governments supporting such efforts
by verifying identity, for example. Blockchain networks
already exist to secure personal information. Individuals are
given a key to their personal information. Encryption on a
blockchain platform like Ethereum provides security, and
individuals can back up their keys on an app, such as a
digital vault. Once their information is veriﬁed (they must
prove who they are) and coded into the network, service
providers can verify information via an individual’s
smartphone or another device. All of this can be linked to
biometric data, thereby ensuring that anyone who loses their
identiﬁcation could easily prove their identity (and fraudsters
would have an extremely hard time faking biometric data).
Advantages of blockchain identiﬁcation include data
portability, decentralization, and relative security. In
addition, digital identiﬁcation is a key gateway to
blockchain applications such as voting.
None of the above requires a government, though
governments can support such entities—thus giving them legal
recognition. There are several proof-of-concept applications with
blockchain-based storage of personal information that involve
governments, though the role of government is largely as an
endorser or a trusted party. For example, Estonia’s e-Residency
program allows citizens to become e-Residents who can register
their businesses and access business services in e-Estonia,
provided they follow Estonian laws and regulations (Sullivan
and Burger, 2017). The digital government of the Zug region in
Switzerland is another example: citizens can have their
government IDs issued through the blockchain and then use
an app for voting in their direct democracy. (Zug, which has
named itself Crypto Valley, is also accepting cryptocurrency for
tax payments.) Painted Rock, a proposed city on a blockchain in
Nevada, United States, has a similar model of establishing a new
government. In each situation, individuals are establishing their
identities on a blockchain, with the government offering the green
light to do so.
There are also situations where a government is unreliable,
and blockchains offer solutions. The UN has implemented
programs that provide people with a digital identity that can
be veriﬁed with eye scans and then allows individuals to receive
funds and food (Juskalian, 2018). The UN’s program sees
recording identities digitally as the ﬁrst step in improving the
distribution of services. In that case, the UN serves as a trusted
third party. In instances where a government is weak, as in
refugee
camps,
trusted
third
parties—international
organizations, such as the UN, USAID, or World Bank—can
supply trust to the contracting process. The information recorded
by these third-party international organizations can then be used
by a governing body (Reinsberg, 2019).
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Digital identiﬁcation could be part of networked public
services, enabling a seamless ﬂow of information about an
individual without any interaction with government agencies,
thus mitigating data silos and bureaucratic jurisdiction blockages.
Individual information could be recorded on a secure blockchain
database. Cryptographic keys could be shared selectively to limit
information only to relevant information for any particular
interaction or entity. Since private transactions (and privacy of
information) become more challenging on public blockchains,
the technical solution for doing so is through public-private
hybrid blockchains that balance openness and accessibility
with privacy considerations. This approach has been piloted
by He3Labs on the Crow reservation in Montana.4 American
Indian reservations have been excluded from many economic
opportunities because of federal regulation. The blockchain
system piloted by He3Labs used a novel public-private
blockchain to balance privacy considerations with performance
and accountability.5
Though blockchains offer possibilities for securing
identiﬁcations with privacy and portability even in precarious
situations, it is not certain that blockchains will be justiﬁed from
the perspective that beneﬁts exceed the costs. If privacy is a
concern, then enabling individuals to place private information
on a blockchain can occur through their personal choices, with
government playing a supportive role. In situations where
government is not available to record information, blockchain
networks offer ways to store personal information and distribute
services beyond recording of information. Of course, veriﬁcation
of one’s identity will typically depend on a government or some
other external validation since blockchains cannot ultimately
verify who someone is.

Public Procurement
Combatting corruption in public procurement is another area
where blockchains have been implemented and show promise
for expansion. Governments increasingly contract out
services in the hopes of increasing the efﬁciency and
accountability of public spending. This rise in outsourcing
creates additional opportunities for corruption. A plethora of
international agencies has established frameworks to combat
corruption, including the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement, and the
UN Commission on International Trade Law, which together
establish frameworks for auditing, accounting, public
availability of procurement law, processes for bidding, and
sanctions for non-compliance. Our review suggests that it is
not clear whether blockchains have advantages over
traditional e-procurement systems.
The World Economic Forum (WEF) initiated the Unlocking
Government Transparency with Blockchain Project to reduce
corruption and provide an effective mechanism in vendor
4
https://www.he3labs.com/blog/2018/7/21/hybrid-blockchain-solutions-real-worldcombinations-of-public-and-private-distributed-ledger-technology-dlt.
5
https://www.he3labs.com/blog/2018/9/4/he3labs-demonstrates-blockchain-e-governmentat-the-100th-annual-crow-fair.
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selection in the public procurement process.6 The WEF’s
Blockchain Project is informed by the consensus in the
literature that corruption reduces economic well-being and
reduces trust in government and e-procurement. To assess
blockchains, WEF compared blockchain-based systems to
e-procurement. E-procurement refers to the use of Internet
technology to automate or integrate any or all parts of public
procurement to improve efﬁciency, transparency, and
accountability to the wider public. It also enables any or all
aspects of procurement to be put on a blockchain—advertising,
tendering, bidding, awarding, purchasing, ordering, contracting,
invoicing. Here, the WEF again takes the lead from anticorruption best practices established by the WTO and UN,
along with the Open Contracting Partnership and Open Data
Charter, which recommend that e-platforms be widely accessible,
have adequate authentication/encryption/security, and have clear
governance (mirroring best practices of non-e public
procurement). The Blockchain Project highlights some of the
limitations of existing e-procurement systems and outlines gains
to be made over Internet-based procurement systems even
without blockchains, as well as ﬁnds that blockchains can
improve public procurement, such as by providing greater
transparency and accountability than traditional e-procurement.
There have been some notable implementations of
blockchains for public procurement. The US Department of
Health and Human Services focused on project cost analysis.
Seoul of South Korea focused on proposal evaluation. And, the
autonomous community in Aragon, Spain, focused on public
procurement vendor selection. The project implemented in
Aragon employs blockchain to increase transparency,
traceability, security, and integrity in vendor selection, with
over 25 contracts since its launch in 2019. The solution is a
hybrid blockchain architecture with the Ethereum public
blockchain coupled with a Hyperledger Fabric permissioned
blockchain to automate tender vendor evaluation that civil
servants review.7
Ukraine’s efforts in e-procurement are a useful example. In
Ukraine, for example, ProZorro (which is an e-procurement
system that is not on a blockchain) has been used to provide a
public record of all public procurement decisions, in the process
reducing corruption in public spending (Shapoval et al., 2017).
The use of blockchain along with digital records of transactions
provides an immutable record of spending, as well as
bidding—another vector of corruption. By relying on
blockchain, the Ukrainian government could reduce time
spent in contracting, reducing fraud in the process. Other
procurement systems are on blockchains in Ukraine, so the
experience provides some opportunity for comparisons or
“conventional” and blockchain-based e-procurement systems.
Based on two of the authors’ experience in implementing
ProZorro, a few observations are in order. ProZorro is not on
blockchain but is widely trusted. One reason is that it is semi-

distributed, with multiple front interfaces—privately-owned
electronic marketplaces (Kyiv School of Economics and Marin,
2016)—that have access to the database and can monitor it.
Access to the whole ProZorro database is publicly available
through open API and dashboards with extensive tenders’
analytics that allows for public monitoring of all actions by
public buyers and private marketplaces. Trust in the system
allowed it to be extended from public procurement to e-sales
of non-performing loans for the amount comparable to 20% of
the nominal GDP of Ukraine in 2016 (Mylovanov et al., 2017).
OpenMarket, a publicly owned e-sale system in Ukraine, is
on a private blockchain but is widely considered corrupt.
OpenMarket runs auctions for arrested assets including those
of Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA)
obtained from criminal proceedings against President
Viktor Yanukovych, overthrown by the Revolution of
Dignity in Ukraine in 2013–2014. The reason for low trust
in OpenMarket is that it lacks transparency and does not
actually follow the principles of decentralization and
openness of the blockchain technology, with all nodes with
the imprints of the database being controlled by OpenMarket.
It illustrates how blockchain, the technology itself, does not
inherently improve outcomes and how their initial
constitutional design inﬂuences their performance.
The theme of e-procurement offering promise, and avoiding
overselling blockchain solutions, is a more general one.
Overwhelmingly, (conventional) e-procurement tends to
reduce corruption by publicizing contracts and criteria,
reducing information asymmetries, preserving a history of
previous arrangements, and limiting ofﬁcial discretion, as well
as increasing vendor competition and government savings. Over
154 countries use some form of e-procurement, but only 24
legally mandate such measures. High-income OECD countries
are leading the way in key issues such as electronic submission of
bids and bid-opening, and much of the process is not fully
transparent. Additional issues with e-procurement are
technological, social, and legal barriers—low levels of internet
penetration, inadequate training, laws that hinder e-procurement
by mandating hard-copy documentation, etc., though such
barriers are not inevitable.
There remain substantial challenges with blockchains. The
example above shows that blockchains can be subjected to
corruption or collusion, regardless of the technology used to
implement procurement. Blockchain procurement can have
additional challenges with privacy and scalability. In addition,
digital divides are relevant—participants require access to
technology, as well as know-how, and governments need
resources to implement blockchains. The WEF noted the
most promise in hybrid, or permissioned, blockchain
implementations, which limit participants and offer a semicentralized and transparent record of transactions. Thus, by
implementing blockchain, governments may be able to reduce
the challenges of fraud, corruption, and waste in procurement.
As blockchain technology improves in scalability, these
beneﬁts are particularly relevant when there are large
increases in spending because of crises. However, as these
examples illustrate, there are few reasons to see blockchains as

6

For a review of procurement and blockchain, see http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_Blockchain_Government_Transparency_Report.pdf.
7
See the appendix to the WEF Blockchain Report:
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a revolutionary tool in public procurement, and in some
instances, blockchains may prove more challenging to
implement than conventional e-procurement.

need to reduce potential fraud, a group of legislators in the US
Congress proposed using blockchain to administer
unemployment funds from the CARES Act. Eleven members
of Congress urged Secretary of Treasury Mnuchin to “. . .utilize
private-sector innovations such as blockchain and DLT
[Distributed Ledger Technology] to support the necessary
functions of government to distribute and track relief
programs and direct that all guidance support the use of
technology to facilitate delivery of CARES Act beneﬁts” (Brett,
2020).9 Administering unemployment payments in the
United States had become challenging with the spike in
unemployment, and blockchain (which has yet to be
implemented) promised to improve the efﬁciency of these
distributions.10
Beyond improving efﬁciency of crisis response,
improvements in public service delivery through
blockchain promise to improve trust in government.
American Indian nations provide another example. There
are currently over three hundred federally recognized
American
Indian
nations,
each
with
sovereign
governments. American Indian reservations are, on
average, the poorest regions in the United States, and so
there is a substantial need for federal assistance. American
Indian nations are often mired in paperwork due to
complicated rules and regulations governing the
relationship between tribal citizens living on reservations
and the government (Crepelle, 2021). Distrust of the
federal government remains an ongoing issue. Though
blockchains have barely scratched the surface of American
Indian reservations, the use of technologies for the provision
of government services is an important consideration as
transparency is a part of sovereign control over records of
American Indian citizens dealing with the federal
government.
Such promise has yet to be realized fully, in part because of
ongoing challenges. One is that such programs to an extent
presuppose very high levels of digitalization, including
placing identities on a blockchain to link them to grants.
In addition, the issues mentioned earlier—access of
individuals to technology, trust in those technologies, and
government capacity to implement blockchain-based delivery
of public services—remain an issue. For example, American
Indian reservations are among the least connected regions in
the United States. Reducing paperwork through digitalization
would likely be as much of an improvement, without the
implementation challenges that affect blockchain systems.
Thus, blockchains offer promise, but much remains
hypothetical.

Networked Government and Public Service
Delivery
Governments routinely disperse grants, though such spending is
often subject to inefﬁciency and, in some instances, corruption.
Service provision can also be mired in paperwork, reducing the
quality of services. These issues can become especially acute
during crises, which can bring corruption (misuse of public
funds for private gain) and fraud (theft by individuals) as a
result of large increases in spending (Leeson and Sobel, 2008).
Disasters can also wreak havoc on records. For example,
hurricanes routinely displace individuals who then may lose
access to their identiﬁcation records. Here, unlike with
procurement, where there has been more experimentation
with public service delivery, applications for public service
delivery have yet to be implemented.
Blockchain can increase the prospects for transferring and
securing information, providing a framework for “smart”
government management of information such as automatic
sharing of information among parties subject to agreed-upon
protocols. Together, that is often referred to as networked public
services. Coordination failures among government, nonproﬁt,
and business organizations have been especially implicated as a
reason for inability of governments to respond quickly to crises,
such as hurricanes (Moynihan, 2009).
Networked public services are a signiﬁcant advantage for the
government. Responding to crises is illustrative. Government
responses to crises involve coproduction, which recognizes
that public goods and services are jointly supplied by
government, nonproﬁt, and private businesses (Parks et al.,
1981). Successful response to crisis involves matching supply
of needed services to demand. That involves supply chains.
Blockchain applications can coordinate government with
suppliers, with information shared on a need-to-know basis.
Such hybrid blockchains recognize that there is a need to
protect privacy of individuals, as well as to share information
with a community of responders.
To date, applications of blockchains for crisis response remain
in proof-of-concept stages. The IBM “Bonds of Trust” project
offers solutions to coordinate government action.8 However, it is
not clear how much these technologies have been deployed by
government. IBM lists examples of deployment to oil and gas
supply chains and to cross-border trade, but of widespread
deployment by governments. Thus, blockchains for crisis
remain aspirational. Since technology exists and private
businesses offer the service, an open question is why
governments have been slow to deploy it.
Blockchains have also been proposed to reduce fraud and
corruption during crisis response. Citing the need to distribute
resources to vulnerable people during the pandemic as well as a

8

9

Indeed, over two dozen members of the US Congress have established the
“Congressional Blockchain Caucus” to promote application of blockchains to
government services. See https://congressionalblockchaincaucus-schweikert.
house.gov/members.
10
Rather than focus on applications to improve public service provision, the
Department of Treasury under President Trump and Mnuchin rushed through
a Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to combat ﬁnancial crimes.

https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/resources/disaster-recovery/
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Public Health

data matches original data, and include the public to validate data.
Again, it could be accomplished without blockchain, but
blockchain ensures all parties with access to the data would be
able to verify and approve any changes.

Blockchain’s improvement in record-keeping, in a
decentralized and distributive setting compared to
traditional recording, make it an attractive option in public
health because not all parties are using the same information
platform. The coronavirus pandemic served as a reminder of
the importance of public trust in public health responses, as
misinformation was an issue, as was the need to coordinate
data on vaccines. Data on clinical trials, validation of data on
trial, etc., all could be improved with blockchain to record and
share information. To the extent such information is
transparently recorded, it could improve trust in vaccines.
Another potential use of blockchain is recording information
on testing, with results that are easily accessible. This is
signiﬁcant as widespread testing is considered an important
public health measure to control the pandemic and ultimately
to unfreeze economies. Companies began to explore how to
use blockchain as a platform to record information about
antibody testing soon after the start of the pandemic (AbdAlrazaq et al., 2021). To the extent that blockchain promises
to reduce human error in evaluating health status and perhaps
to ensure privacy to a greater extent, blockchain can have
important advantages over traditional record-keeping in
managing public health. In addition, essentially anything
that constitutes public health information could be placed
on a blockchain, increasing both the speed and accuracy at
which information could be used by scientists, medical
professionals, and public health ofﬁcials globally.
The social challenges of compliance in pandemic management
remain, although they may be mitigated by better privacy and
transparency affordances through blockchain. Privacy concerns
about widespread surveillance testing and contact tracing, actions
critical to curtailing cases, may be alleviated through blockchain
privacy. Questions about data accuracy and recording have also
hampered the management of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Accurate data dashboards that rely on smart contracts could
provide for even greater trust in these data. Trust is signiﬁcant
here as there is also misinformation on COVID-19 cases, in the
most extreme cases with conspiracy theories about the extent of
the virus. While blockchain cannot itself provide an antidote to
conspiracy theories, the presence of an immutable record would
be a useful response to such ideas.
Applications have moved beyond the proof-of-concept stage.
In Estonia, the government provides, among other things, a
secure database of health records that has been extended to
businesses. Still, such applications are limited to date. As such,
reforms to public health involving blockchain remain an
opportunity. In response to the coronavirus pandemic, IBM
established MiPasa, a project that supports an open data hub
to detect COVID-19 carriers and infection hotspots.11 It can of
course be done without blockchain, though blockchains offer
superior integration of data and conﬁdence in data. In addition,
MiPasa can reconcile disparities in government data, ensure new

Public Finance
Taxation is an area where governments have made some progress
in implementing blockchain-based solutions. Efﬁciency in
taxation relies on the identiﬁcation of citizens and their
taxable activities and assets. Inefﬁciencies due to fraud and
corruption are also challenges in taxation. Small scale
applications have shown some promise in the tax realm.
Taxation is complicated, as there are taxes on income,
transactions, business, and assets. There are exemptions for
nonproﬁts. Blockchain has not been implemented across all
types of taxation, though for certain classes of transactions, it
has been implemented successfully, as the following example
from Denmark illustrates.
The Government of Denmark is exploring blockchain
technology to effectively collect taxes on used car sales.
They partnered with the private company Nets to develop a
system, Vehicle Wallet, that maintains all the available data on
a vehicle in a decentralized public ledger (Notheisen et al.,
2017). The implementation is part of an effort to streamline
the Danish taxation apparatus. Not only does this blockchainbased system allow tracking and sharing consistent
information, but it also helps identifying fraud and validity.
Vehicle Wallet is just a ﬁrst step in a larger effort by the Danish
Tax Administration to implement blockchain in most of their
processes to minimize operational costs and eliminate
repetitive manual tasks.
Government spending can also be put on a blockchain.
Governments disperse large sums for various causes, in a
process that is frequently convoluted and inefﬁcient, causing
money to be lost to banking fees, brokers, and potentially
corrupt ﬁnancial diversions. Blockchains could be used to
build public trust in such systems—disintermediating and
reducing the number of actors in grant awards could reduce
costs and streamline initiatives. Examples include a pilot program
in Buenos Aires focused on the city’s arts and cultural grants and
some similar plans for NSF grants in the US. Though blockchains
promise efﬁciency, it is not clear that programs such as the NSF
require such improvements, as the grant process is largely
effective in distributing funds to researchers. A more
signiﬁcant application is public procurement, as discussed
above, though our review suggests that e-procurement may be
a cheaper, nearly as effective, alternative.

Democracy
Another application of blockchains is voting. One of the
challenges in democratic political systems is corruption in
voting. Blockchain promises to improve democracy by
providing an immutable record of votes and greater veracity
and security in the identiﬁcation of voters, thus offering election
security, integrity of voter registration, and reductions in
election tampering—as well as improvements in trust in
government (Allen et al., 2019a). Though surveys have

11
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2020/03/mipasa-project-and-ibm-blockchainteam-on-open-data-platform-to-support-covid-19-response/
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identiﬁed limitations with e-voting and novel affordances
offered by blockchains for voting (Hjálmarsson et al., 2018),
the potential of blockchains is likely to encourage
experimentation with democracy outside of government
elections. Thus, the use of blockchains to secure elections,
while useful, only scratches the surface of blockchain
applications to democracy, as self-governance is an aspect of
democracy beyond elections that is strengthened by
blockchains.
The governments of Denmark and Australia have geared
efforts towards developing blockchain-based voting platforms.
For instance, the Australian postal service, Australia Post, is
starting an initiative to research blockchain technology for
voting purposes (Sinclair, 2020). They plan to start with
community and private sector elections until they can
eventually move to nationwide voting. Thus, one expects that
this could further improve the quality of government, help
people learn the value of blockchain, and increase its
adoption. The ﬁasco in the Democratic caucus in Iowa in
February 2020 presidential primary in the US—when the
votes were not counted until the following day because of a
bug in an app—shows that any technology has risks, as well as
beneﬁts.
There are risks with any system. Social trust in the
technology is an issue. Another is that digital voting, even
on a blockchain, may be subject to manipulation or
cyberattacks, but with no paper trail. This runs the risk that
blockchains will be used along with paper as a redundancy,
thus reducing some of the beneﬁts from such technologies.
There are also privacy risks with blockchains that must be
addressed, as any such voting system would require some
features of a private blockchain to preserve anonymity of
votes for many voting applications.
To date, surveys of blockchains and democracy have
focused on security of elections. This is a narrow notion of
democracy that excludes broader logics of self-governance and
collective action, including freedom to associate with others,
that are also central aspects of democracy. Here, blockchains
offer much promise. The Internet provides for communication
in collective action, while blockchain opens up new
possibilities for governance.12 Blockchains offer a new
technology for collective action. DAOs, or Decentralized
Autonomous Organizations on the blockchain, are another
potential improvement in collective action. Blockchains
provide new opportunities to experiment with constitutions
for such organizations. Painted Rock and Zur could also be
thought of as collective action with blockchain, where the
result is a new form of government in response to perceived
challenges with traditional governance institutions. People
would be free to create their own rules, as blockchains are
mini-exercises in constitution-building (Alston, 2020),
including experimenting with voting rules that could not be
implemented at scale in “normal” political institutions (Allen
et al., 2021a).

12

Reviews of blockchain applications to public sector governance
emphasize personal data (such as birth certiﬁcates and social
security cards) and voting. Such a view risks underestimating the
role of blockchains in the public sector since governments can
also deploy blockchains to the governance framework for
economic exchange.
One potentially promising application of blockchains is for
governments to initiate processes of placing real property on
blockchains. Currently, most economies have legal rights to real
property that are backed by governments. Blockchains promise
greater transparency in transactions and improved speed, though
the necessity of blockchain is far from clear, as real estate markets
in most contexts where blockchains have been implemented were
largely functional.
As Alston et al. (2018) explain, organizations articulate rules,
and so rules can be divided into government rules, or public rules
(including laws, constitutions, and regulations), and private rules
(such as company policies, contractual commitments, codes of a
criminal organization). Blockchains promise new solutions in
several of these areas, especially property relations, contracts,
licensing, and the realm of cryptocurrencies.
Regarding real (physical) property relations, blockchains have
been considered as a way to increase the efﬁciency of land
registration. Blockchains can save participants in real estate
markets billions in transaction fees, as well as provide
opportunities to transfer partial property rights. Ultimately,
the entire property system could be placed on blockchains,
with transactions initiated on smartphones (Graglia and
Mellon, 2018). By integrating blockchain land recording
systems, countries could technically enable property
transactions on a global scale. In some contexts where trust in
government is an issue, governments hope to use blockchains to
reduce vulnerability to corruption and even expropriation of land
by government. In this way, blockchains could expand
transparency in land registration and, ultimately, improve
security by providing a decentralized, publicly veriﬁable, and
difﬁcult-to-tamper-with record-keeping system.
The Republic of Georgia has put millions of deeds on the
blockchain. In 2016, the Georgian Ministry of Justice, Bitcoin
mining company BitFury, the Republic of Georgia’s National
Agency of Public Registry, and economist Hernando de Soto
announced plans to implement a blockchain-based land
registration to add security to land transactions data. It
enables auditors to make real-time audits (thereby auditing
the registration not once a year but nearly continually).
Blockchain reduced friction in registration by decreasing
the cost of property registration. It allows people to
register land using their smartphones and provides a
notary service (Shin, 2016). By 2017, the Georgian project
was expanded, with nearly 1.5 million parcels entered on the
blockchain (Shin, 2017). The project resulted in great cost
savings (Qiuyn and Price, 2018).

https://medium.com/blockchannel/blockchain-is-governance-e0d827b97b3f.
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The Government of Ghana is using blockchain-based
technology to solve two structural problems: determining the
legal status of land ownership and solving longstanding
miscommunication problems between the Ghanaian Land
Commission, property owners, and ﬁnancial institutions. A
central problem of miscommunication is inefﬁciency. For
instance, providing collateral data for a property, a simple
administrative process, was taking up to a year. Another
example, the government hired BenBen, a company using
blockchain systems for land management. BenBen records
geospatial, property transactions, and land information in
Ghana to provide a complete picture of the status of a
property. Additionally, all parties involved have access to the
same ledger. Due to this shift to blockchain for land recording and
other procedures, administrative processes like registering
collateral now take only 3 months. And the time needed to
obtain property data decreased from 1 month to 3 days
(Kshetri and Voas, 2018).
From these examples and the ones above, it appears that
governments that place property registration on a blockchain can
reduce fees and thus encourage transactions, leading to more
productive use of properties and more potential tax revenue.
However, the promise of blockchains must be tempered as
follows. First, in the examples above, governments remain the
central entities for recording property ownership–including
recording ownership and securing agreements over who owns
what—before putting it on a blockchain. Blockchains themselves
cannot formalize property rights. In countries without a reliable
registry of land, it is necessary to ﬁrst digitalize ownership. This is
signiﬁcant because the quality of property rights depends on
registries, or repositories of information that are easily accessible
(Arruñada, 2012). Thus, blockchains are not a solution in the
absence of sufﬁcient investment by governing in addressing issues
with informal or incomplete property rights.
Second, there are transaction costs of unbundling property
rights. Property is traditionally thought of as land and
improvements such as buildings on it, but it can also include
mineral rights below ground, water rights, etc. Put another way,
property rights are bundles of rights. If they can be unbundled, a
society beneﬁts from the greater possibilities of exchange,
provided the government can enforce the rights (Ellickson
1993). Unbundling rights creates complexities that result in
higher transaction costs. Blockchain may facilitate this process
by keeping track of complex rights such as fractional
rights—subdividing individual parcels—or the full unbundling
of rights. There is also the potential for fully peer-to-peer
contracting, as well as integration of blockchains—enabling
smartphone-initiated trades over the smallest units of
property. Each of these potential applications of blockchain in
property rights depends on recording land ownership in the ﬁrst
place, as well as digitalization of identiﬁcation, which, as we’ve
seen, depends on the government or a trusted party. In addition,
blockchain has features of a knowledge commons, which applies
the logic of the resource commons to other domains, including
intellectual property (Madison et al., 2010) and technology
(Bustamante et al., 2020). One way to think of blockchain is
that it creates a framework for essential knowledge about the
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property to be shared, thus increasing the value of property rights
(Allen et al., 2021b). Still, the transaction costs of unbundling still
exist, and blockchain can only reduce them once some are
addressed.
Third, usability gap is an issue with blockchains. For example,
property transactions can occur on a blockchain, but very few people
know enough about their property to digitalize all the information.
There is also a need for most property transactions to have people
physically present to verify the features of a property.
Fourth, digital governance of land may be efﬁcient compared
to blockchains. Digitalization is costly to implement, and further
introduction of blockchain may not offer many advantages over
such digitalization. In lower-trust environments, simple
community-based recording of information is often all that is
needed in a community to provide greater certainty with land
registration (Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili, 2016). In
Afghanistan, for example, land recording at the community
level with very simple technology, without a role for
government, is often most effective in improving certainty
about property ownership (Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili,
2021), though the ability to implement anything on a
blockchain—given concerns about usability, and access to
technology—are questionable at best.
Blockchains thus remain an area with promise, though their
ability to redeﬁne property governance is questionable
(Arruñada, 2018). To date, blockchain is implemented for
more routine transactions, and interoperability remains a
faraway dream. Nor is it clear they are needed in higher-trust
environments.

Business Licensing and Banking
Governments have also been exploring applications of blockchain
to improve the efﬁciency of business licensing and banking.
Besides property registration, an important aspect of the legal
framework of business is providing easy opportunities for
businesses to secure a license (de Soto, 2000). Blockchain is
used to bring together private and public sectors in an
expedited and secure manner. Dubai’s Smart City initiative
seeks to use technology, including blockchain and AI, to
increase government efﬁciency and reduce costs of doing
business. Some of its accomplishments include using
blockchain to issue business licenses more quickly and to
make all business and government transactions entirely
paperless, thereby increasing the efﬁciency of transactions in
both the public and private sectors (Donovan-Stevens, 2020).
Governments can create a legal environment to encourage
businesses to adopt blockchain. It can beneﬁt the government
because it creates incentives for businesses to locate within its
jurisdiction if it is less costly to run a business. An important
example is the US state of Delaware, which is home to most
Fortune 500 companies, has the most initial public offerings in
the US, and is the corporate host of many venture capital-backed
businesses from around the world—making it one of the world’s
most concentrated corporate centers. Already friendly to
business, the state’s government was also receptive to
blockchain technology. In 2017, Delaware’s governor
announced the Delaware Blockchain Initiative, including
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amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law. Its
purpose was to create legal institutions that take advantage of
blockchain technology, including recognizing smart contracts
(Klayman et al., 2017). Several other states had already given
smart contracts the same legal weight as traditional pen and paper
contracts. Blockchain-friendly regulatory and legal institutions
can provide states with a competitive advantage.
The Delaware Blockchain Initiative simultaneously hoped to
improve commerce and the quality of public sector governance.
In 2017, the Delaware Public Archives worked with Symbiont, a
distributed ledger and smart contracts startup, to archive state
records on a blockchain to secure government records, reducing
opportunities for fraud. Although the deal collapsed, they signed
another agreement with IBM to develop blockchain-based
digitalization of records in 2018. Also, in 2018, Colorado
lawmakers passed a bill requiring governments to consider the
use of blockchain for record-keeping. Governor Jay Polis also
formed a 12-person blockchain council, as well as appointed a
“blockchain solution architect” in 2019. Polis’ hope is to
“establish Colorado as a national hub for blockchain
innovation in business and government” (Freed, 2019). Since
then, the governor has hosted a meeting called Consensus to
further consider blockchain governance applications, including
in 2021 considering using blockchain to collect taxes—thus
directly speaking to the ways in which blockchain can be used
to beneﬁt the government, as taxation is arguably the deﬁning
function of a government.13
Singapore’s government has been active in applying
blockchain to banking. In 2016 they launched a 6-week
project to explore the potential of distributed ledger
technology for ﬁnancial transactions within the central
government and other ﬁnancial institutions around the world.
In conjunction with private companies, the central bank of
Singapore was facing signiﬁcant challenges in government
securities transactions. On average, they were able to conduct
transactions for only 2 h a day due to the complexity of balancing
accounts and informing all parties involved. Moreover, they
wanted to implement a system that would run 24/7 with
minimal human intervention. To solve the problem, Singapore
used blockchain as a decentralized system that would run 24 h a
day while maintaining a uniform copy of all transactions for all
parties involved. After developing the systems, they made the
code open source to encourage research and further development
by academic and private institutions (Berryhill et al., 2018).
Blockchain applications have also been employed to regulate
illicit and illegal activities and international trade. In Dubai,
blockchain is being explored as an alternative for the diamond
trade because of the high rate of illicit trading. Speciﬁcally, the
government is interested in digitizing the process of managing
diamond certiﬁcates to avoid conﬂict diamonds from entering
the market. In Afghanistan, blockchain businesses are working
with Afghan gem traders, along with the UN, to place gem
information on a blockchain (Langhorne 2020). Blockchain has

an important potential role in addressing illegal trades in
artifacts. For example, there has been some discussion of its
application to the theft of cultural artifacts from Native
Americans (Moskowitz, 2019). The idea is that blockchain
could better regulate authentication in art markets, thereby
reducing incentives to engage in the theft of cultural artifacts.
In some areas, blockchain is a source of self-regulation when
regulations are complex and uncertain. For instance, web
services enabling sex workers to connect with clients have
been shut down because of child welfare concerns and sex
trafﬁcking regulations, or more generally because the activity
is morally repugnant (Roth, 2007), even though they also
facilitate legal activities. A blockchain-based app,
SpankChain, allows sex workers to work on a robust
platform that cannot be taken down in a single node (Cowen
2019). Such apps can be a tool to enforce contracts when using
the courts is difﬁcult (Cunningham and Kendall, 2017). A
matching platform, Craigslist, has been shown to improve
the safety of sex workers (Cunningham et al., forthcoming).
Thus, apps like SpankChain, which also provide greater
anonymity for patrons, could provide added protections to
vulnerable sex workers.

Cryptocurrencies and Macroeconomic
Policy
Much of the discourse on cryptocurrencies focuses on whether
these currencies compete with government. Central banking is
considered a core function of public sector governance.
Blockchain promises what has been called polycentric
banking, which has as one of its manifestations allowing the
choice of currency besides those controlled by central banks
(Salter and Tarko, 2017). Despite the concern of losing control,
central banks are issuing their own digital currencies. These
central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) would serve as a bank
for anyone and provide services to people, much like a regular
bank. Under any agreement, central banks would have to ensure
the interface between people and their currencies is transparent
and open. Relatedly, central banks in several countries are
exploring open banking, where the central bank shares
information with other banks provided the customer allows
such sharing of information (Prates, 2020).
In June 2021, the government of El Salvador decided that
cryptocurrency must be accepted as a payment for services.14
Speciﬁcally, every economic agent must accept bitcoin, and all
obligations in money expressed in USD may be paid in Bitcoin. In
April 2022, lawmakers in Central African Republic, one of the
world’s poorest countries, voted to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender.15
Debates are ongoing regarding what this means.16 For our

14
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-approves-ﬁrst-law-bitcoinlegal-tender-2021-06-09/
15
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61248809.
16
George Selgin considers some of the cons of forcing businesses to accept Bitcoin.
See https://www.alt-m.org/2021/06/17/the-bitcoin-law-nayib-bukeles-counterfeitfree-choice-in-currency/

13
https://www.9news.com/article/money/colorado-cryptocurrency-taxes/73-873ba24afceb-42a0-a349-4632ed6e38a5.

Frontiers in Blockchain | www.frontiersin.org

11

June 2022 | Volume 5 | Article 869665

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4156869

Bustamante et al.

Government by Code

purposes, the message is clear: Bitcoins do not strictly compete
with governments, as some governments require them to be
accepted alongside traditional currencies.17
Political considerations are an issue with blockchains.
Returning to Ukraine, in 2019, the government considered
introducing a semi-cryptocurrency on a public or state
blockchain, called e-hryvnia. However, regulators opposed its
introduction for fear of losing control over monetary policy. At
the time, the regulators believed that they would be second
movers after developed countries. Because of a lack of trust in
the government, there is some justiﬁcation for the use of
blockchains. However, the government worried about losing
what little control it has left. Thus, banning cryptocurrencies is a
defensive move (Hendrickson and Luther, 2017).

buy-in, and the potential for regulatory mistakes arising from a
misunderstanding of blockchain technology.18 Still, politicians
and governments require incentives to deploy such technology,
and their motivations may not align with improving social
outcomes.
Beyond these obstacles, there is a question of the political
digital divide. For governments adopting blockchains to improve
the efﬁciency of transactions, the challenge is less loss of political
control and more the fact that countries or locales that already
have high levels of trust in government and administrative
capacity are more likely to improve the quality of public
sector governance. These places are more ready to adopt new
technologies such as blockchain, but the gain is likely to be small.
On the other hand, countries with lower levels of trust in
government, lower administrative capacity, and less developed
infrastructure may have more to gain by adopting blockchain
technology. However, they face many obstacles. One of them is
startup costs: deploying and maintaining the technology is costly,
and not all governments have the resources to do it (as many
confront challenges with the digitalization of records or recordkeeping). Another issue is building trust in the technology. People
can read their social security cards and hold on to them. With
blockchain, everything becomes digital, and that creates some
rational fears of where the information is ultimately located and
whether it is secure. Synergy between public sector governance
and blockchain applications will depend, as with any technology,
on the design, implementation, and populations it serves.
One reason the political digital divide is signiﬁcant is that
blockchains may be most advantageous when trust is low in
government. These are the same governments where the ability to
implement blockchains is also low, such as lack of technological
savvy. What appears to be most likely is continued marginal
improvements in the quality of public administration in countries
that already have governance advantages—countries such as
Denmark and China, which are conventionally understood as
enjoying higher-quality public-sector governance (Fukuyama,
2013).
There remains another important opportunity for government
to enable blockchains. Pilot proposals for smart cities that use
blockchain extensively are occurring in rich countries, such as the
Painted Rock example in the United States, because there is the
technological infrastructure to support such initiatives.
Blockchain contracts are developed without government but
depend to an extent on a legal framework that recognizes
those contracts. Here, the role of government is to offer
autonomy for development and to recognize the outcomes of
decentralized coordination. For example, if citizens decide to
implement blockchain solutions for local elections, governments
can recognize the outcomes of those elections.
Another political consideration is that the implementation of
blockchains may beneﬁt from learning from experimentation.
This suggests that relatively decentralized political systems may
have an advantage. In the United States, the federal system

CONCLUSION
Blockchain is a ﬁrst successful ledger that can provide a
decentralized and distributed system that supports
transactions of goods and services among individuals and
businesses. The most signiﬁcant conclusion of our review,
which would not be apparent from any individual survey of
blockchain applications to government in a speciﬁc realm (such
as voting), is that blockchains offer opportunities for nearly all
aspects of public administration. Our review also highlights that
governments can use blockchains to provide a more robust
economic framework. This does not mean government
necessarily has the lead. In many instances, governments can
facilitate the emergence of blockchain by enabling decentralized
innovation and integrating blockchain solutions into legal
frameworks. Still, our review also suggests that such
applications have barely scratched the surface. For this
reason, an emergent area is to consider more explicitly where
blockchains have been adopted and to assess their performance,
especially compared to “conventional” digital technologies. The
above comparison of e-procurement with blockchain-based
procurement in Ukraine is one example where successful
blockchains
adoption
critically
depends
on
its
implementation. Adopting the technology itself is not the
only consideration.
Another theme of our review is that there are both
implementations by government and implementations that
involve government providing autonomy for blockchain
development. Implementations by government include
changes such as putting social security numbers and birth
certiﬁcates on blockchains and deployment of blockchains for
public procurement. The World Economic Forum suggests
several general hurdles to the adoption of public sector
blockchains, including the small number of large-scale public
blockchains that have been tested to date, the need to establish
systems for error correction, the necessity of administrative

17

The libertarian criticism is that mandating acceptance of bitcoins undermines
choice, though resolving that is not necessary for our stock-taking exercise in
this paper.
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provides signiﬁcant opportunities for states to experiment with
blockchain regulation. States such as Wyoming are challenging
Delaware as the leader of the crypto hub (Castillo, 2020; Chon,
2021). Other governments can then learn from the experience of
states and municipalities that adopt smart government
technologies. To the extent states face constraints in
implementing these technologies, national governments still
play a signiﬁcant role in encouraging adoption.
Our review suggests several areas for future research. While
there are indexes of blockchain use and regulations favorable
to blockchain, there are currently no indexes of the extent of
blockchain deployment by governments. Developing such an
index would be useful to measure progress and challenges
with government deployment of blockchains. Another area
for future research is to better understand the challenges of
scaling up blockchains. Many pilot programs have been
attempted, but few have become national policy. Real
property registration is an example where proof of concept
has been shown but scaling up appears to be an issue.
Blockchain is an innovative technology and holds many

promises, but carefully evaluating whether it is the right
technology for each application is critical. Ultimately, this
review demonstrates that blockchain’s contribution to public
sector governance is not yet fully realized and, even as it is
embraced in more governance contexts, it promises more
augmentation than revolution.
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